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INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of search incident to arrest provides that, as an incident
to every lawful full custody arrest, law enforcement officers have an automatic right to conduct a thorough search of the arrestee and the area
within his immediate control.' Although the Supreme Court has stated
that the search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment's
general requirement of a search warrant has been "settled from its first
enunciation," 2 the doctrine should be reexamined in terms of constitutional jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court in Chimel v. Califormia attempted to enunciate
standards that would limit unreasonably broad area searches. Since the
Court's 1969 decision in Chimel lacks a defensible rational basis, however, lower courts have applied the Chimel standard inconsistently. This
inconsistent application of Chimel stems from the Court's failure to consider the implications of Terry v. Ohio 4 in formulating a more rational
approach to searches incident to arrest and also from its failure to
address the critical problem presented by the presence of third parties at
the scene of an arrest. Moreover, lower courts have had to grapple with
the realization that the standards limiting area searches established in
Chimel may encourage sloppy police work, delayed and pretext arrests,
and the fabrication of probable cause to justify such searches. The widespread use of the search incident to arrest exception by police further
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1. See Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752,762-63 (1969).
2. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,224 (1973).
3. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
4. 392 U.S. 1(1968).

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:53

supports the need for reconsideration of the doctrine. The finding of a
1967 study that more than 90 percent of all searches receiving court consideration were incident to an arrests indicates that the exception
virtually has swallowed the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The displacement of the warrant process as a primary method for
conducting searches raises issues central to the criminal justice system.
Designed to interpose a neutral, detached magistrate between the police
officer and the citizen, the warrant process allows the objective weighing
of the facts against a legal standard before an individual's privacy is
invaded; it separates law judgment from law enforcement. If the
majority of searches are being conducted without warrants, however,
this important safeguard against unreasonable invasions of privacy is
subverted.
The Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Robinson6 and
Gustafson v. Florida7 further underscore the need to review the search incident to arrest doctrine. In Robinson and Gustafson the Court held the
search incident to arrest exception applies to all in-custody arrests, including those for minor traffic violations.' Writers have criticized the
decisions,9 but they are a logical outgrowth of the Court's holding in
Chimel that a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of a person, incident to his arrest, without further justification. This application
of the search incident to arrest rule threatens to undermine further the
Constitution's warrant requirement and mandates a reexamination of the
doctrine.
The doctrine of search incident to arrest has generated considerable
uncertainty and ambiguity. The Supreme Court's pronouncements in the
area have changed frequently. The first section of this article reviews the
common law foundation of warrantless searches, analyzes the leading
Supreme Court decisions from Weeks v. United States10 to Chimel, and
critically examines Chimel and related cases. The second section
5. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYR & D. ROTENBURG, DETECTION OF CRIME 105, 122 (F. Remington ed. 1967).
6. 414 U.S. 218(1973).
7. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
8. 414 U.S. at 236 (seizure of heroin found during search incident to arrest for driving
after permit revoked upheld); 414 U.S. at 263-64, 266 (seizure of marijuana found during
search incident to arrest for driving without license upheld).
9. See, e.g., Note, WarrantlessSearches andSeizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV.
835 (1974); Note, Restricting the Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest: United States v.
Robinson, 59 VA. L. REV. 724 (1973); Comment, Search Incident to Arrest for Minor
Traffic Violations, 11 AMi. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (1973); Comment, Searches Incident to
Arrest: The ExpandingExceptionto the WarrantRequirement,63 GEo. L.J. 223 (1974).
10. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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analyzes the impact of Chimel on subsequent case law and criticizes the
distinction drawn in those cases between personal and area searches. In
concluding that every search incident to a lawful full custody arrest is
not per se justifiable, the article suggests standards by which the
validity of such searches may be determined and proposes a modernized
warrant process incorporating those standards.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE COMMON LAW THROUGH Chimel
American courts have assumed erroneously that English common law
established an absolute right to search an arrestee incident to a custodial
arrest." A limited right did exist at common law, but the mere occurrence of an arrest did not always create a right to search. A leading
English decision, Leigh v. Cole,' 2 specifically qualified the right to search
incident to arrest: "Even when a man is confined for being drunk and
disorderly, it is not correct to say that he must submit to the degradation
of being searched, as the searching of such a person must depend on all
the circumstances of the case. 11 3 Professor Bishop cites Leigh for the
proposition that not every search incident to arrest is valid.'4 According
to Bishop, an officer must keep the prisoner until lawfully discharged,
but he may search the prisoner only if he fears escape.' 5 Other commentators, however, have discussed the doctrine in more absolute terms:
Pollock and Maitland, for example, observe that at early common law "if
by hue and cry a man was captured when he was still in seisin of his
crime-if he was still holding the gory knife or driving away the stolen
beasts- ... he could not be heard to say he was innocent, he could not
claim any sort or form of trial. 1 ' 6 Courts have cited the "hue and cry"
passage and other common law sources to explain the origin of search incident to arrest,17 but a more reasonable interpretation of Pollock and
11. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 195-96, 142 N.E. 583,
584 (1923).
12. 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 329 (1853).
13. Id. at332.
14. 1 J. BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 210, at 152 &n.75 (2d ed. 1913).
15. Id. § 210, at 152.
16. 2 F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 577 (2d. ed. 1898).

17. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 278 F. 650, 653-54 (N.D.W. Va. 1922); United
States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1908); State v. Hassan, 149 Iowa 518, 52324, 128 N.W. 960, 963 (1910); People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 196, 142 N.E. 583, 584
(1923). In Dillon v. O'Brien the court considered whether a search incident to arrest may
be conducted and concluded that
constables... are entitled, upon a lawful arrest by them of one charged with
treason or felony, to take and detain property found in his possession which will
form material evidence in his prosecution for that crime....
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Maitland's thesis is that evidence of an individual's
guilt rather than the
18
arrest itself justifies seizure of an individual.
The common law does not support the Supreme Court rule upholding
the validity of any search incident to an arrest. Indeed, it reveals that a
search must be based on a justifiable purpose. The fourth amendment attempts to assure that every search is reasonable and has a justifiable purpose by establishing the general rule that searches must be preceded by a
warrant based on probable cause.1 9 Searches incident to arrest constitute
an exception to this rule, but the doctrine lacks a consistent and defensible rationale and itself has become an inflexible rule.
Three early twentieth century Supreme Court cases form the foundation of the search incident doctrine: Weeks v. United States,20 Carroll
v. United States,21 and Agnello v. United States. 2 None of these cases,
however, involved a search incident to arrest. In Weeks the Government
had seized the defendant's personal papers in a series of warrantless searches of his home and used the papers as evidence against the defendant
after his arrest at his place of work.23 The Court ordered return of the
papers but asserted that the right to search the person of the accused
when arrested has been "uniformly maintained in many cases."2 Eleven
years later, in Carroll,the Court upheld the right of law enforcement officials to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle prior to arresting the
driver. The police, acting under the National Prohibition Act," had
probable cause to believe that the car was transporting liquor.2 6 In
responding to defense claims that the search was illegal because Carroll
had not been arrested, the Court, while noting the validity of the Weeks
dictum that arrest justifies the warrantless search of the person, concluded the search was justified nonetheless because the officers had
reasonable cause to believe the automobile contained liquor." InAgnello
16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245,249 (Exchequer Div. 1887).
Justice Frankfurter notes confusion as to whether the search incident to arrest doctrine
resulted from the "hue and cry," from a need to deprive the prisoner of means of escape, or
from a desire to prevent destruction of evidence. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
609 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
18. See Note, Searches of the PersonIncident to LawfulArrest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 866,
868-70 (1969).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
20. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21. 267 U.S. 132(1925).
22. 269 U.S.20 (1925).
23. 232 U.S. at 386-87.
24. Id at 392. The Court did not cite any American precedent to support its recognition
of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
25. 42 Stat. 223, ch. 134, § 6 (1921), amending 41 Stat. 315, ch. 85, § 25 (1919).
26. 267 U.S. at 134-35.
27. Id. at 158-59.
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the Court held unconstitutional a warrantless search of an arrestee's
home several blocks from the place of the arrest." Citing only Weeks and
Carroll,the Court again noted in its discussion that the power to search
incident to arrest, including the place in which the arrest is made, "is not
to be doubted."2 9 Since none of these three cases involved a search incident to an arrest, the Court did not feel constrained to analyze
thoroughly the search incident to arrest doctrine; the Court simply
assumed the validity of the doctrine in Weeks and reaffirmed that assumption in the later two cases.
Interpretation of the doctrine of search incident to arrest did not
remain constant. In Marron v. United States0 the Court held that police
could search for and seize all items that were part of a criminal enterprise
and on the premises in the immediate possession and control of the
arrestee' 1 The term immediate possession and control was defined
broadly in Marron to include the entire business establishment.3 2 Four
years later, in Go-BartImporting Co. v. United States,33 the Court cited
two reasons for refusing to sanction a search that was quite similar to
that undertaken in Marron:the Government had time to secure a search
warrant and the arresting officer had not witnessed an overt act being
committed pursuant to a conspiracy.3 4 In United States v. Lefkowitz 35
the seizure of business papers from an office similarly was disallowed on
the ground that no overt act pointing toward a conspiracy had been committed in the officer's presence.3 6 In both Lefkowitz and Go-Bart the
Supreme Court emphasized that, unlike the situation in Marron where
the property seized was in plain view of the arresting officers, the property seized by the police was uncovered after a general search of the
premises . The distinctions among these cases, however, are dubious: all
three involved conspiracy and the seizure of business records from an en28. 269 U.S. at 30-31.

29. Id. at 30. The Court used a negative proposition as authority for its converse:
"While the question has never been directly decided by this court, it has always been
assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant except as
an incident to a lawful arrest therein." Id. at 32.
30. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).

31. Id. at 199.
32. Id. at 198-199 (warrant authorized search for illegal liquor; seizure of business
ledger from closet and utility bills from beside cash register upheld as incident to arrest).
33. 282 U.S. 344(1931).

34. Id at 357-58.
35. 285 U.S. 452(1932).
36. Id at 463. The Court in Lefkowitz found Go-BartImporting Co. v. United States

controlling; the exploratory searches would have been invalid even under a search warrant
since police sought mere evidence and not contraband. Id. at 465-67; see 282 U.S. 344,
357-58(1931).
37. 285 U.S. at 465; 282 U.S. at 358.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:53

closed area. In attempting to distinguish Marron instead of directly
overruling it, the Court in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz further confused the
search incident to arrest doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. United States 8 marks a
change from the earlier cases. In upholding an extensive police search of
the defendant's home, the Court reasoned that the defendant
"possessed" all rooms searched, that the evidence-two cancelled
checks-could be secreted anywhere in the house, and that the specific
location of the arrest should not limit the scope of the search. 9 The implications of the broad holding of Harrisconflict directly with the Court's
admonition in Lefkowitz that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to
search for evidence. ' 40 Consistent only in its vacillation, the Court announced its fourth different formulation of the rule and implicitly
overruled Harrisone year later in Trupiano v. United States.4 1 The Court
upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant in Trupiano but suppressed evidence of an illegal still because agents who seized it could
have obtained a search warrant.4 2 Invalidating the search, the Court
made a remarkably broad statement concerning the right to search incident to arrest that comports with the English common law:
The mere fact that there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a
search or seizure without a warrant. Otherwise the exception
swallows the general principle, making a search warrant completely
unnecessary whenever there is a lawful arrest. And so there must be
some other factor in the situation that would make it unreasonable or
impracticable to require the arresting officer to equip himself with a
43
search warrant.

38. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
39. Id. at 151-53. While searching for two cancelled checks to implicate the defendant in
mail fraud, the FBI agents in Harris found several altered draft cards in an envelope
marked "personal papers." Id. at 148-49. In sustaining the defendant's conviction for
possessing, concealing, and altering the draft cards, the Court concluded that Harris had
committed the crime "in the very presence of the agents conducting the search" merely by
possessing the cards. I&. at 146-47,155.
40. 285 U.S. at467.
41. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
42. Id at 705.
43. I at 708 (citation omitted). The Court's warning that the exception might swallow
the general principle merits close attention. The fourth amendment requires warrants to
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. A search incident to arrest, however, allows officers great discretion in defining the scope of the search as long as the search is reasonable. 334 U.S. at 710. "[Mluch of
the potency of the right of privacy" depends on this difference in standards for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant and those incident to an arrest. Id
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Two years later the Court overruled Trupiano and apparently revived
Harrisin United States v. Rabinowitz.44 The Court inRabinowitz upheld
the complete search of the office in which the defendant was arrested
even though the police knew in advance what they were seeking and had
time to secure a warrant. 45 The Court essentially ignored the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement in sustaining the defendant's conviction, which was based on the evidence seized, and declared that "searches turn upon the reasonableness under all the circumstances and not
upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the warrant is
not required. '46 The Court's decision in Rabinowitz, which remained
good law for 19 years, posed serious threats to individual rights by encouraging warrantless searches; the Court's intimation that a search
warrant is never necessary when a search is made incident to arrest 4 7 undermined the fourth amendment's protection.
In Chimel v. California48 police officers arrested the defendant in his
home for burglary of a coin store and, without either a search warrant or
the defendant's consent, thoroughly searched the three-bedroom house,
attic, and garage. 49 In considering whether a warrantless search of the entire house could be justified as incident to an arrest,5 0 Justice Stewart,
writing for the Supreme Court, noted the inconsistency of prior decisions
on search incident to arrest and observed that Rabinowitz was "hardly
founded on an unimpeachable line of authority."-" The Court then
specifically overruled Rabinowitz and Harrisbut held that the police, as
an incident to a lawful arrest, may conduct a warrantless search of the
"arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 52
The rule announced in Chimel allowing a search of an area within the
defendant's immediate control resulted from the Court's concern with an

44. 339U.S.56 (1950).
45. Id. at 65-66 (search of desk, safe, and file cabinets in arrestee's office upheld).
46. Id The Court explicitly overruled any language in Trupiano suggesting that warrants are required whenever practical and instead held that the validity of all searches
would be evaluated on the basis of their reasonableness after the arrest. I& at 66.
47. Id. at 65-66.
48. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
49. Id at 753-54. The police officers in Chimel arrived at the defendant's house, were
admitted by his wife, and arrested the defendant when he arrived home. I& at 753.
50. Id at 755.
51. Id- at 760.
52. Id at 763. The Court in Chimel separated its discussion of searches of the arrestee's
person and its analysis of searches of the area in which the arrest was made, but it concluded that the same rule should govern both personal and area searches. Id at 766-67.
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arrestee's access to weapons and to concealable or destructible evidence
of his crime. S3 Instead, the Court assumed that searches for evidence are
just as reasonable as searches for weapons. 54 Protecting policemen and
preventing escapes, however, have no necessary relation to the preservation of evidence. The Court in Chimel assumed the two objectives to be
inextricably related. That assumption obscures the entirely different purposes of the two types of searches: weapons must be found to protect the
officer whereas evidence must be located to preserve it for trial.
The Court's analysis is also unsatisfactory because it assumes that the
fact of an arrest, regardless of the circumstances, justifies a search.55
Although recognizing the fallaciousness of the same reasoning in Harris
and Rabinowitz, the Court in Chimel implied that many of a suspect's
fourth amendment rights disappear on arrest.5 6 Indeed, the Court
criticized its own failure in earlier cases to insist on a meaningful relationship between the search and the arrest s7 but nevertheless suggested that
searches not based on probable cause justifiably may be made incident to
an arrest as long as they are confined to an area smaller than that searched in Harris andRabinowitz 8 The standard established in Chimel differs only in degree from the earlier law, 9 and the Court, instead of
analyzing the constitutional issues, continues to eschew application of
traditional fourth amendment principles to searches incident to arrest.
APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
WEAPONS SEARCHES

In the term before its decision in Chimel, the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio,1o considered the precautions police officers could exercise in protecting themselves from assault. Whether the Court in Chimel should have
53. Id54. Id. at 762-63.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 767-68. Justice Stewart noted in the Court's opinion that "one result of decisions such as Rabinowitz and Harris is to give law enforcement officials the opportunity
to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging
to arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere." Id- at 767.
58. Id.
59. But see Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 559 (1970) (Chimel overruled at least 19 years of precedent and drastically restricted
right of police to conduct searches incident to arrest).
60. 392 U.S. 1(1968).
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looked to Terry for guidance on the standard to be applied to warrantless
searches for weapons poses an interesting query. The issue in Terry was
whether it is unreasonable for the police, without probable cause for an
arrest, to seize a person and conduct a limited search for weapons. 61 Recognizing that the fourth amendment governs such pat-down searches,
the Court sought to define precisely the circumstances that justified such
limited invasions of privacy. The Court balanced the need for crime
prevention and police safety with the need to protect personal rights,
concluding that when a police officer is confronted with someone whom
he reasonably suspects is armed and presently dangerous, he may con62
duct a limited weapons search of the person's outer clothing.
The Terry standard ties the power given a policeman in the stop and
frisk setting to the circumstances of the moment. The officer must be
able to point to clearly articulable facts that justify his search and must
63
demonstrate that the circumstances justified the scope of the search.
The Supreme Court in Terry implicitly concluded that the fourth amendment's reasonableness clause required that a search have a legitimate
purpose, that the scope of the search reasonably be tied to its purpose,
and that the objective cannot be achieved by less intrusive means. In applying these criteria in Terry, the Court recognized the need for police
discretion in stop and frisk situations as well as the inherent subjectivity
of on-the-spot observations.
The guidelines for weapons searches established by the Court in Terry
apply only to investigative stops and, arguably, different standards
should govern weapons searches incident to arrest. Since police must
have probable cause to make an arrest and the custody of an arrestee will
continue beyond the presence of the arresting officer, an arrestee
justifiably may be subjected to a more intensive search than the patdown authorized in Terry. The argument that the fact of an arrest
justifies a different standard for initiating weapons searches, however,
ignores the justification for such searches. The standard for any weapons
search, of the person or the area surrounding the arrestee, should reach at
least the minimal level of justification announced in Terry: an officer
may frisk for weapons only if he has reason to believe that a suspect or an

61. Id. at 4. In Terry the officer confronted three men loitering in front of a store; when
the men mumbled answers in response to the officer's questions, the officer spun Terry
around and patted down the outside of the defendant's clothing, finding a pistol. I& at 48.
62. I& at 30. The Court emphasized that the rule in Terry did not represent a retreat
from the constitutional requirement that police must, whenever practicable, obtain a
search warrant prior to any search. IM at 20.
63. Id. at 21.
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arrestee is armed and presently dangerous or has quick access to a
weapon. The Court's decision in Chimel, however, ignores potential application of this analysis to a search incident to arrest and affords an
arrestee little protection from governmental intrusion. Under Chimel an
officer may search for weapons incident to an arrest regardless of the circumstances. By not following the logic of its decision in Terry, the Court
in Chimel further confused the already muddled law of search and
4

seizure.6

EVIDENCE SEARCHES

The Court in Chimel ignored the problem presented by the presence of
third parties at the scene of the arrest by concentrating on the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest. If police had not searched
the defendant's house in Chimel at the time of his arrest, his wife could
have disposed of the evidence before the police returned with a warrant. 6
Chimel, therefore, squarely presented the issue of third party access to
destructible evidence; the Court, however, did not treat the problem in
66
sanctioning the warrantless search.
A year after its decision in Chimel, the Court in Vale v. Louisiana6
again neglected the problem posed by the presence of third parties at the
scene of an arrest. In Vale the Court invalidated the search of a narcotics
dealer's house after his arrest on the front porch.68 Although the search
was not incident to an arrest under Chimel,69 the defendants' furtive
movements coupled with the officers' observation of a narcotics sale outside the house arguably gave the officers probable cause to believe that
the house contained narcotics.70 The Court reasoned, however, that since
the police had obtained an arrest warrant, no reason existed for failing to

64. See United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1099-1101 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 414 U.S.

218 (1973) (Terry frisk effective protection for police officers stopping or arresting
suspect). See generallyNote, supranote 18, at 879.

65. 395 U.S. at 753-54. The evidence sought in Chimel was a number of coins taken in a
burglary. Id at 754.
66. Justice White argued in dissent that a warrantless search was justified because the
defendant's wife could have disposed of the inculpatory evidence after the officers left.
See id at 775 (White, J., with Black, J., dissenting).
67. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).

68. Id. at 32-33. As in Chine4 only the dissenters in Vale considered the need to
protect against destruction of evidence by third parties. IM at 38 (Black, J., with Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
69. IM at 33-34.
70. Id. at 32-33, quoting 252 La. 1056, 1066-68, 215 So. 2d 811, 814-15 (1968) (state
supreme court's decision in State v. Vale).
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procure a search warrant before the arrest.7 1 The Court failed to recognize
that if the police had left to obtain a warrant someone inside the house
could have removed or destroyed the narcotics.2
Although Vale reflects a healthy attitude toward the need for search
warrants, it has not aided effective law enforcement. Indeed, the Court's
approach in Chimel and Vale, distinguishing between personal and area
searches instead of analyzing the distinct functions of searches for
weapons and searches for evidence, may restrain unduly the police in conducting area searches for evidence. In personal searches incident to
arrest the police may conduct a full scale search for both weapons and
evidence without regard for the circumstances. Similarly, the Court's
decision in Chimel sanctions, without probable cause, a search of the area
within the arrestee's immediate control; the area outside the arrestee's
immediate control, however, cannot be searched without a warrant even
if the police have probable cause to believe seizable evidence is present.
In Vale and Chimel the Court neither considered such anomalous results
nor devised a standard with which lower courts could evaluate the
lawfulness of evidence searches incident to arrest. In Chimel the officer's
right, even in the absence of probable cause, to conduct a limited warrantless search incident to arrest was affirmed; nevertheless the Court did
not extend that right to situations where probable cause that evidence
exists and may be destroyed is established. Similarly, in Vale the
majority eschewed the issue of the possible destruction of evidence by
simply noting that the goods seized by the police "were not in the process
of destruction.""
A comparison of the Chimel rule with the warrant exception in
automobile cases further illustrates the uncertain status of the search incident doctrine. In Carroll v. United States7 4 the Supreme Court upheld
the warrantless search of a car where the police had probable cause to
believe the automobile contained contraband, reasoning that
automobiles easily can be hidden or removed from the jurisdiction.75 The
71. 399 U.S. at 35.
72. See id at 38 (Black, J., with Burger, C.J., dissenting). The defendant's mother and
brother in fact did arrive immediately after Vale's arrest. Id- at 33.
73. Id-at 35.
74. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
75. Id at 153. Many cases have cited Carroll for the general proposition that, because
of their mobility, searches of automobiles are not subject to the same constitutional standards as searches of dwellings. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970)
(search of defendant's car at station after earlier arrest for robbery upheld); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964) (search of car after arrest for vagrancy held
invalid; Carroll distinguished); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1948)
(dictum) (automobile more vulnerable to warrantless search); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931) (warrantless search of automobile based on probable cause upheld).
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automobile exception implicitly assumes that protection against removal
of evidence is more important than guaranteeing the rights safeguarded
by the warrant requirement. Since all evidence, whether located in a car
or a home, can be destroyed or hidden, however, the Court should address
the problem of third party access to evidence in all situations. Only by articulating new standards for all evidence searches can the Court properly
reconcile concerns for effective law enforcement and fourth amendment
guarantees.
IMPACT OF

Chimel v. California ON SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
SEARCHES OF THE ARRESTEE

Cases since Chimel involving personal searches of individuals arrested
for relatively trivial offenses illustrate the present abuse of the concept of
search incident to arrest. Instead of protecting citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy from official invasions, Chimel has provided a
rationale for otherwise unjustifiable intrusions. Searches incident to
arrest may consist either of on-the-spot searches of an arrestee's person
or station house inventory searches.
On-the-spot searches.
Many courts have relied on Chimel to
ratify searches at the scene of arrest that otherwise may have been termed unlawful under the fourth amendment.76 These searches typically
have followed arrests for minor violations but have produced evidence of
more serious crimes. In United States v. Dyson,7 7 for example, police
found a plastic vial and an envelope of heroin while searching an arrestee
charged with shooting craps. 7 8 Although acknowledging that the search
could be justified only if it was necessary to protect the officers transporting Dyson to jail, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ignored
the absence of evidence indicating that any of the officers had reason to
believe the defendant was armed and did not question the propriety of extending the scope of a Terry frisk in an arrest setting." The search in
Dyson was valid under the Chimel standard because no probable cause or
justification is required to conduct a search incident to arrest; the search
76. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 453 F.2d 1028, 1030 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 925 (1972); State v. Ponce, 16 Ariz. App. 122, 125, 491 P.2d 845, 848 (1972);
People v. Perry, 47 Ill. 2d 402, 407-08, 266 N.E.2d 330, 332-33 (1971); State v. Garcia, 210
Kan. 806, 809-10, 504 P.2d 172, 174-75 (1972); State v. Henneke, 78 Wash. 2d 147, 149-50,
470 P.2d 176, 179 (1970).
77. 277 A.2d 658 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).

78. Id. at 658.
79. Id. at 659.
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also might have been justified as a search for destructible evidence since
dice can be concealed in pockets, but the court did not even consider this
justification for the search. The same court in United States v. Bynum 0
again failed to consider the factual circumstances or the absence of
probable cause; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals merely
mouthed the search incident to arrest rule of Chimel in upholding a
search that led to the discovery of heroin in a tire thief's pocket8
Nothing in the record indicated that the police reasonably could have believed that the defendant was armed, 2 and evidence of automobile stripping clearly cannot be secreted on the person.
The Chimel standard has encouraged police to use any arrest as a
justification for personal searches. Although nothing in Chimel suggests
that the rule does not apply to all custodial arrests, however trivial the
offense, many courts have found the Chimel standard inapplicable to
traffic offenses, since in such cases there is no evidence for the arrestee to
hide or destroy; these courts, when confronted directly with Chimel's
irrational rule, have attempted to limit the decision's application. 83 The
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Curtis8 4 represents the
high-water mark of these decisions. The Minnesota state police stopped
Curtis for driving without taillights and for making an improper turn.
Before placing the defendant in the squad car for temporary detention
pending a check on the validity of his driver's license, the police arrested
and searched him. One officer found a package containing marijuana in
Curtis's pocket. Another officer, suspecting that Curtis had dropped
something into his car before approaching the squad car, simultaneously
found a loaded revolver on the front seat.8" The court declined to sanction
the search of Curtis's person as incident to the traffic arrest, noting both
the triviality of the offense and the impossibility of discovering any
tangible evidence.8 6 Indeed, the court in Curtis stated that such a search
could be valid only if the officers had probable cause to believe that the
80. 283 A.2d 649 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
81. Id. at 649-50.
82. Id. at 650.
83. See State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 430-31, 190 N.W.2d 631, 634 (1971); People v.
Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 101,228 N.E.2d 783,785,281 N.Y.S.2d 789,792 (1967). Many courts
have emphasized the potential for abuse; police could arrest an individual on a minor
charge in order to conduct a warrantless search. See, e.g., People v. Xapp, 43 Misc. 2d 81,
83, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (Erie County Ct. 1964); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638,
644-46, 374 P.2d 989, 992-93 (1962); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 125-26, 130 N.W.2d
264,269 (1964).
84. 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971).
85. Id. at 430,190 N.W.2d at 632.
86. Id- at 430-31, 190 N.W.2d at 633.
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suspect was armed and dangerous; 87 the prosecution failed to establish
that standard of probable cause.8 8 The court's insistence on evidence that
the defendant was armed and dangerous contrasts with the requirement
established in Terry that only reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify
a frisk. The lower standard of reasonable suspicion may be justified to
protect lives, but a search of a person for evidence should be based on the
higher standard of probable cause; a search must have a clearly defined
purpose and must be judged in light of its purpose even if it is incident to
arrest.
People v. Superior Court 9 further illustrates the need for a requirement that the police must define clearly the purpose of a personal
search. Stopped for driving at night without lights, the defendant
claimed that his 13 year old automobile had just blown some fuses. When
he could not produce his automobile registration or any identification,
the defendant was placed under arrest and searched; the search disclosed
a plastic packet of marijuana in his pants pocket. 0 The Supreme Court of
California refused to apply Chimel to traffic arrests, recognizing that a
search may be incident to a lawful arrest but still unreasonable in scope.'
The court concluded that a traffic arrest other than one for driving under
the influence of drugs or alcohol can never justify a search for evidence;92
only a police officer's reasonable belief that the arrestee is concealing a
weapon can justify a personal search following an arrest for a minor traffic violation. 3 The court found convincing the fact that otherwise innocent citizens are arrested frequently for routine traffic violations.94
Noting that the moment at which a police officer-citizen confrontation
crystallizes into an arrest is elusive,9" the court refused in this instance to
read into the fourth amendment the search incident exception. This interpretation illustrates the faulty approach of Chimel. Since the facts
surrounding any police officer-citizen confrontation should determine the
necessity or lawfulness of any personal search whether or not that con87. Id at 436-37, 190 N.W.2d at 635-36. The discovery of the revolver in the automobile
was independent of the personal search of the defendant and was not challenged on appeal.
Id at 430,190 N.W.2d at 632.
88. Id at 437,190 N.W.2d at 636.
89. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205,101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
90. Id at 191-92,496 P.2d at 1209-10, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
91. Id at 201,496 P.2d at 1216,101 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
92. Id at 201-02,496 P.2d at 1216,101 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
93. Id at 206,496 P.2d at 1220,101 Cal. Rptr. at 852. This standard is more lenient than
that enunciated in Curtis in that it is almost identical to that required for a Terry stopand-frisk. See notes 60-63 supraand accompanying text.
94. 7 Cal. 3d at 195,205-06,496 P.2d at 1210,1219, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 844,851.
95. Id at 204,496 P.2d at 1218,101 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
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frontation ever matures into an arrest, no precise rule can define the permissible scope of a search. Chimel created such a rule without reason. The
Court should have based Chimel on carefully enunciated fourth amendment standards and should have presented guidelines generally applicable to every search incident to arrest.
The confusion of lower courts in applying Chimel to traffic arrests forced the Supreme Court to treat this specific issue in United States v.
Robinson96 and its companion case, Gustafson v. Florida.9 7 The defendant in Robinson was arrested for operating a motor vehicle after
revocation of his license. A pat-down revealed a soft bulge in Robinson's
coat pocket; the officer removed a wadded cigarette package from the
pocket, opened the package, and found several gelatin capsules filled
with heroin.9 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed Robinson's conviction. 9 Although ruling that
mere arrest can justify only a search to obtain the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crime for which an arrest is made,'0 0
the circuit court held that an arresting officer may conduct a limited
weapons search even without a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is
armed and presently dangerous. 101 Since opening and examining the contents of a cigarette package could not be justified as a weapons search,
however, the court concluded that the police had exceeded the
parameters of a legitimate search. 10 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court
followed Chimel and rejected the distinction between evidence and
weapons searches, 0 3 reversed the court of appeals decision, and held that
the fact of any arrest creates authority to search thoroughly; searches incident to arrest require no further justification.10 4 The Court inRobinson
96. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
97. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).

98. 414 U.S. at 220-23.
99. 471 F.2d 1082,1087-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
100. Id. at 1094.
101. Id. at 1098. The court did distinguish between a routine traffic stop in which a
weapons search would have to be justified and the Robinson situation, which it termed an
in-custody arrest. Id. at 1097.
102. Id. at 1099. Four members of the District of Columbia Circuit dissented from the
court of appeals' reversal of Robinson's conviction; those judges specifically noted the
testimony of a concealed weapons expert that several deadly or incapacitating weapons
could have been found in the cigarette package the officer searched. See id. at 1117
(Wilkey, J., with Tamm, MacKinnon & Robb, JJ., dissenting).
103. 414 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1973). In the companion case of Gustafson v. Florida,the
Supreme Court affirmed a Florida Supreme Court ruling that had reversed and harshly
criticized a lower court decision similar to that of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Robinson. 414 U.S. 260, 261 (1973); see State v. Gustafson, 258 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1972).
104. 414U.S. at235.
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foreclosed any further reliance on Terry in determining the validity of
searches of arrestees: "Terry v. Ohio ...did not involve an arrest for
probable cause [but merely]... an investigative stop based on less than
probable cause to arrest.... ",05
An examination of early authorities provided the Court with slight
support for the proposition that an arrest alone validates a personal search.10 6 Citing the previous Supreme Court cases dealing with search incident to arrest, the Court referred to "the unqualified authority of the
arresting authority to search the person of the arrestee"'' 0 and found
that "[in] Chimel... full recognition was again given to the authority to
search the person of the arrestee... ."108 The Court inRobinson properly
refused to accept the proposition that an in-custody traffic arrestee
inherently can be assumed to be less dangerous than any other
arrestee. °9
The decision in Robinson was the logical outgrowth of the Court's
holding in Chimel. Indeed, Robinson did not change the law of search incident to arrest; it simply affirmed Chimel's automatic search rule.
Law enforcement authorities
Station house inventory searches.
have another opportunity to search arrestees indiscriminately when the
arrestee is detained at the station house.110 The right to search an
arrestee thoroughly at the station house suggests that a search incident
to arrest represents no additional infringement of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. Since an earlier search lessens the chance of an
assault on a police officer or the destruction of evidence, the search at the

105. Id at 227.
106. See id. at 232.
107. Id.at 225.
108. Id.at 225-26.
109. Id.at 234.
110. See, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, 453 F.2d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283,1287 (5th Cir. 1970); Cotton v. United States, 371
F.2d 385, 392 (9th Cir. 1967). In Cotton v. United States the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
issue of station house searches and concluded:
It was proper for the police to require [the arrestee] to turn over to them, when he
was booked, the property, including papers, that he had on his person. This is
standard and necessary police practice.
371 F.2d at 392.
Only those arrestees who are able to post collateral or obtain a prompt pretrial release
by other means can avoid a predetention inventory search. See United States v. Mills, 472
F.2d 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (narcotics discovered during inventory search
suppressed because defendant not timely informed of right to post collateral and avoid
inventory search).
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scene of arrest seems more practical. This analysis ignores, however, the
availability of several viable alternatives to the station house inventory
search.''
A predetention inventory search has two legitimate purposes: to
protect authorities from spurious claims by arrestees that property has
been stolen or misplaced during incarceration and to keep potentially
12
dangerous articles, such as drugs or weapons, out of the prison area.'
The first purpose could be served without a search simply by allowing the
arrestee to sign a waiver releasing the police from any responsibility for
his possessions. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
13
suggested one possible
Columbia Circuit in United States v. Mills"
solution to the second problem of keeping contraband from the prision
area with minimal intrusion on fourth amendment rights: "[A] less extreme intrusion on privacy ... [than a search may] mark the limits of
reasonableness, . .. [such as] giving him an opportunity, like that accorded someone given a bathhouse locker for temporary use, to 'check'

his belongings in a sealed envelope

....

.

114

This concept offers a prac-

tical approach to preventing arrestees from smuggling weapons or drugs
into jail without infringing their right to privacy more than is absolutely
necessary. Prior to the predetention search, the arrestee should be given
the opportunity to place any personal belongings into a locker, envelope,
or safety deposit box. The belongings would not be inventoried, and the
body search for weapons and drugs would proceed.
Although subjecting the arrestee's person to a search still represents
an intrusion, this limited invasion is far less objectionable than that
resulting from routine station house searches. The District of Columbia
Circuit's suggested procedure also will discourage pretext arrests, since
any evidence of a crime other than that for which the defendant was
arrested could be confidentially checked by the arrestee prior to the
predetention weapons and drugs search. Allowing an arrestee to check
his personal belongings before being searched at the station house gives
the maximum possible protection to his fourth amendment rights
without compromising the legitimate governmental interest in security
of the jail area.

111. See Note, The Inventory Search of an Offender Arrested for aMinor Traffic Violation: ItsScope and ConstitutionalRequirements,53 B.U.L. REV. 858,869-72 (1973).
112. See People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 274, 291 n.7, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318, 329 n.7
(1969).
113. 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. Id at 1239 n.11.
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SEARCHES OF AREA WITHIN ARRESTEE'S IMMEDIATE
CONTROL

The standard established in Chimel governing area searches also has
proven an inadequate guide for lower courts. Although the Supreme
Court overruled its earlier decisions inHarrisandRabinowitz,its opinion
in Chimel effectively has made little impact on the scope of area searches.
Creative police officers and sympathetic judges have extended the test of
area within the immediate control of the arrestee for area searches well
beyond the limits the Court intended to set, and courts often rely on the
alleged need to protect the arresting officer in upholding a purely evidentiary search.'15 Such irrational extensions of the Chimel standard never
would have been made if the Court had required justifications for a
search incident to an arrest other than the mere fact of an arrest.
Courts have interpreted Chimel quite broadly whenever a case contains
any implication that the search may have been for weapons. In three
nearly identical cases, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on that
6 The court
rationale in overruling the reversal of narcotics convictions. ,
found the searches and seizures valid in these cases because the arresting
officers intended to transport the arrestees to the station house and
therefore needed to search the arrestees' possessions for the officers' own
protection. 1' 7 Although the Delaware court expressed a proper concern
for the safety of the officers, the triviality of the offenses in these
cases-hitchhiking-once again raises the possibility of pretext
arrests.118
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Patterson'"further illustrates how courts will
expand the concept of the area within the arrestee's immediate control
whenever the police proffer a weapons search theory to justify a search.
Defendant's wife in Pattersonwas arrested in the living room of the
family apartment pursuant to a valid arrest warrant charging her with
115. See, e.g., United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,

417 U.S. 930 (1974); United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424,427 (10th Cir. 1971); State
v. Culver, 288 A.2d 279, 283-84 (Del. 1972).

116. State v. Culver, 288 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972). The three cases consolidated on appeal in
Culver involved searches of hitchhikers and highway pedestrians. Id. at 280, 284. The
police searched suitcases, a bedroll and duffel, and a laundry bag and seized narcotics from
each. Id.
117. Id. at283-84.

118. See id at 285. The court recognized the possibility of pretext arrests in the three
cases consolidated in Culver but concluded that all three arrests were made in good faith.
Id.
119. 447 F.2d424 (10thCir. 1971).
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uttering a forged instrument. Police detained the defendant and his wife
in the living room while conducting a search of the home. From a
partially open kitchen cabinet, officers then seized and examined the
contents of a manila envelope that implicated the husband in a robbery of
a safety deposit box.121 The court inPattersonreasoned that the search of
the kitchen was reasonable in assuring the safety of the officers and sus1
tained the defendant's conviction.12
Although a weapon located in another room can be within the
arrestee's reach, nothing in Pattersongave the officers even a reasonable
suspicion that a weapon might presently be used, and nothing in the
kitchen cabinet was remotely accessible to the arrestee or to her husband.
Indeed, five police officers were present and detained appellant and his
wife in the living room throughout the search. ' The court's alleged concern for the officers' safety caused it to ratify what can only be termed an
12 3
extended search for evidence.
These cases illustrate that the area test articulated in Chimel has failed
to achieve its stated purpose of limiting the scope of area searches; the
searches in many of the cases resemble those at issue in Harris and
Rabinowitz whose unreasonably broad scope the Court specifically
sought to limit in Chimel. Chimel's purpose has been perverted precisely
because its rule requires no prior justification for a search incident to

arrest. To effectuate Chimel's stated but unrealized purpose, any

120. Id, at 425-26.
121. Id at 427.
122. Id. at 425-26; cf Holmes v. State, 228 So.2d 417, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(per curiam) (evidence seized eight feet from arrestee held within area of control). The
court in Pattersonspecifically rejected appellant's argument that the Chimel rule invalidated the search of the kitchen, noting the defendant's wife had positioned herself in the
doorway between the living room and the kitchen and could have had access to the kitchen
"by merely turning around." 447 F.2d at 426.
123. See 447 F.2d at 426. See also United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974) (seizure of gun from coat in closet while arrestee
detained on bed valid); United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 53, 55 (6th Cir. 1973), cert
denied, 416 U.S. 922 (1974) (seizure of LSD from drawer five feet away from arrestee
valid); United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204, 1207 (3d Cir. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 1151 (1973) (seizure of stolen credit cards from briefcase while arrestee
handcuffed valid); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1972) (seizure
of evidence from small box in closet while defendant seated on chair in middle of room
valid); People v. Spencer, 22 Cal. App. 3d 786, 797-98, 99 Cal. Rptr. 681, 687-88 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (seizure of gun, evidence of armed robbery, from box while defendant handcuffed valid). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently has indicated that where the police concede that the defendant posed no threat to their safety, a
warrantless search of another room will not be sustained. See United States v. Erwin, 507
F.2d 937,939 (SthCir. 1975) (illegal sawed-off shotgun found in closet suppressed).
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weapons search at the scene of the arrest should be preceded by at least a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee has access to a weapon in the area
being searched; any search for evidence should be based on the stricter
standard of probable cause to believe such evidence exists and is in im24
minent danger of being concealed or destroyed.
One court even has upheld an area search for weapons when the police
themselves were responsible for providing the arrestee with access to the
area in question. In Giacalone v. Lucas'1 the defendant was arrested at
6:00 a.m. in his pajamas, and the police, ostensibly concerned about his
appearance before the magistrate, requested that the defendant dress.'2 6
Prior to allowing defendant to obtain his clothing, however, officers
searched the defendant's dresser drawers for weapons and discovered an
illegal blackjack; the defendant subsequently was convicted for possession of it.127 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, reasoning that
the search properly was incident to a lawful arrest. 2 8 Although the
officers' fear that the defendant might obtain weapons from the chest of
drawers was well-founded, only their actions brought the chest of
drawers within the area of arrestee's immediate control. By sanctioning
the search, the court in Giacalone may have encouraged the police to
29
employ the same rationale as a pretext in similar situations.
THIRD PARTY SEARCHES AT THE
SCENE OF ARREST

The Supreme Court first addressed the problem presented by the
presence of third parties at the scene of arrest in United States v. Di
Be. 30 The defendant, who was a passenger in the automobile of an
individual arrested and searched on probable cause for selling counterfeit
gasoline ration coupons, was also searched.13 ' Rejecting the govern124. Applying this standard of probable cause to area searches would expand the
Chimel rule slightly. Cf United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220,222 (10th Cir. 1971) (court
justified seizure of suitcases from underneath bed out of reach of arrestee on ground of
"plain view").
125. 445 F.2d 1238 (6thCir. 1971), cert. denied,405 U.S. 922 (1972).
126. Id.at 1245.

127. Id.
128. Id.at 1246.

129. In sustaining the search as incident to a lawful arrest, the Sixth Circuit emphasized the district court's holding in Giacalonethat the police had arrested the defendant in
good faith and upon probable cause and had not used the arrest as a subterfuge to make
the search. Id.
130. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
131. Id. at 583.
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ment's contention that probable cause to search the car conferred a right
to search passengers who might easily conceal the contraband,13 2 the
Court held that Di Re's conviction for possession of counterfeit ration
coupons resulted from evidence that was the fruit of an illegal search. 133
Although the Government attempted to distinguish personal searches of
third parties in automobiles from personal searches of third parties in
dwellings,134 the Court noted that an occupant of a dwelling could as
easily conceal evidence as the occupant of an automobile. 13S Spurning the
government's argument of practical necessity, 136 the Court concluded
that the fourth amendment's protections against oppressive police conduct supersede any governmental interest in preventing the concealment
or destruction of evidence; 137 the rights of third parties do not vanish
138
merely because they are present at an arrest.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Chimel does not address either the
rights of third parties present at an arrest or the powers of the police to
search those third parties. The lack of useful guidelines for third party
searches has resulted in confusing and contradictory lower court
decisions. In treating searches of third parties, a few courts have
emphasized the different objectives of evidence and weapons searches
and have balanced the need to protect the police with the individual's
fourth amendment rights. Many other courts, however, have failed to
distinguish between the different objectives of weapons and evidence
searches or, worse, have upheld apparent evidence searches by terming
them weapons searches or security checks. Several post-Chimel cases involving third persons present at an arrest illustrate the fictions employed
by courts to sustain searches that otherwise would fall outside the limits
set by Chimel or be prohibited by the ruling inDiRe. These cases suggest
that courts will approve police action whenever third parties might represent a threat to arresting officers.
132. Id at 587.
133. Id at 595.
134. Id. at 587.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 595.
137. Id. The Second Circuit had characterized DiRe's arrest as "utterly indefensible; a
mere scooping up of all those present on the chance that any associate of the principals was
probably engaged in any dealings between them, or, if not, in other transactions of the
same kind.... "159 F.2d 818,820 (2d Cir. 1947), afrd, 332 U.S.581 (1948).
138. 332 U.S. at 587. Courts also have held that a search warrant does not justify
searching third parties encountered on the premises specified in the warrant. See State v.
Bradbury, 109 N.H. 105, 106, 243 A.2d 302, 303 (1968) (marijuana illegally seized from
visitor to dormitory room); State v. Carufel, 106 R.I. 739, 748-50, 263 A.2d 686, 691-92
(1971) (remand to determine whether seizure of cannabis from visitor to apartment valid).
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In United States v. Benyhill,139 for example, the defendant was convicted of possessing the contents of a letter stolen from the mail. Two
counts of the indictment were supported by evidence obtained from a
search of the handbag of the defendant's wife conducted at the time of
Berryhill's arrest. 140 Although the arresting officer's testimony that he
saw several envelopes protruding froij the top of a paper sack in the
purse indicates that he searched the handbag for evidence, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit characterized the search as
a weapons search.141 Applying a theory analogous to guilt by association,
the court upheld the search as a lawful weapons frisk: "Terry recognizes
and common sense dictates that the legality of such a limited intrusion
into a citizen's personal privacy extends to a criminal's companions at
' 42
the time of arrest.'
Although Berryhill and DiRe can be distinguished on the ground that
the evidence inBerryhillwas admitted against the original arrestee while
that inDiRe implicated the third party,14 1 the court's reasoning inBerryhill conflicts with the logic of Di Re and Chimel. In Di Re the Court
specifically concluded that a person does not lose his fourth amendment
rights merely by being present in a suspect's car 144 and Chimel allows a
search only of the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate control. 45 Neither decision provides blanket authority for the
search of third parties. Furthermore, the pat-down of Mrs. Berryhill
would have been justifiable under the Terry standard only if the officers
had had reasonable suspicion that she was armed and presently
dangerous. 46 The court inBenyhill approved the search, however, without any evidence indicating that the defendant's wife was presently
armed and dangerous.

139. 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971).
140. Id at 1191-92.
141. Id at 1193. The court in Berryhillapproved the frisk of the defendant's wife on the
ground the police knew that the defendant often carried a weapon. Id The court's
reasoning ignores the fact that the police had ample time to secure a search warrant and
that only letters were visible inside the purse. Id. at 1191-92; cf. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971) (where police anticipate discovery of evidence,
warrant generally required).
142. 445 F.2d at 1193.
143. But see United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(Berryhill cited as support in upholding conviction of arrestee's companion based on
seizure of cocaine from his shoulderbag).
144. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,587 (1948).
145. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
146. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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1 4 the United States District Court for
In United States v. Manarite
the Southern District of New York admitted evidence seized from a
search of an end table within reach of two persons sleeping in the
arrestees' apartment at the time of their arrests. 14 8 Although the arresting officers did not know the identity of the two sleeping men and the
area searched fell outside the physical reach of the arrestees, the court
characterized the area surrounding the sleeping men as in the "constructive reach" of the arrestees. 149 While the court found the search of
the end tables proper under the guidelines of Chimel, the Supreme Court
in Chimel did not make any reference to anything other than the actual
physical reach of the arrestees. Manarite encourages police to conduct
broad evidentiary searches without a search warrant and then to claim in
court that they were acting to protect themselves. Berryhill and
Manarite together demonstrate that courts seeking to determine the
legality of police action often will ratify questionable searches out of a
concern for arresting officers' safety. This justified concern has led to an
unreasonable expansion of the scope of the area in which police may
search incident to arrest.
Courts also have approved extensive searches of arrestees' homes on
the basis of police suspicion of the presence of third parties who could
destroy or conceal evidence. Is Such security checks often yield evidence
that the police otherwise could not obtain without a search warrant. In
United States v. Blake,15 1for example, a third party at a narcotics arrest
who attempted to dispose of evidence was himself implicated by that

147. 314 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 947 (1971).
148. Id. at 615. The arrestees in Manarite were suspected of conspiring to transport
obscene material for purposes of sale or distribution. Id. at 611. The arresting officers,
FBI agents, had a valid arrest warrant but no search warrant, even though they had
known of the arrestees' possible involvement 15 days prior to the arrest. Id. at 611,613.
149. Id. at 615. The court termed the sleeping men "extensions of... [the arrestees']
physical presence ... " Id.
150. Compare United States v. Looney, 481 F.2d 31, 33-34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1070 (1973) (machine gun seized during security check admissible where police conducted search knowing defendant operated. with confederates) and United States v.
Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (narcotics seized during security
search of entire house admissible since drugs easily could be disposed of by accomplice)
and People v. Mann, 61 Misc. 2d 107, 113,305 N.Y.S.2d 226,232 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (dictum)
(security check of apartment reasonable where police knew defendant did not act alone)
with United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974,979 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970)
(pistol seized from yard to prevent its removal or destruction by defendant's family
inadmissible; fourth amendment considerations outweigh police need to obtain evidence).
151. 484 F.2d50 (8thCir. 1973).
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evidence.1 5 2 While executing an arrest warrant against the defendant's
roommate for possession and sale of narcotics, the arresting officer saw
Blake throw a purse down a laundry chute after the unexpected presence
of the police had prevented Blake from throwing it off the back balcony of
the apartment. The officers went to the basement and recovered the
purse from the bottom of the laundry chute. 15 3 The Eighth Circuit condoned the search of the chute on two alternative theories: the arresting
officers had a right to make a security check of the basement for possible
additional third parties after already discovering one additional person
on the premises and the warrantless search was justified by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence. 4 The second rationale recognizes a
genuine law enforcement imperative: the probable destruction or removable of evidence. The court apparently felt compelled by existing
case law precedent, however, to provide a security justification for the
search. Indeed, although the officers were looking for the purse dropped
by the defendant, the court termed their discovery of the purse inadver155
tent.
Subsequent cases strongly suggest that courts essentially have
ignored the arbitrary limits of Chimel.156 The Chimel standards would not
justify a search under the Blake circumstances, for example, because
the basement laundry chute was not within the area of immediate control
of the arrestee. The Supreme Court in Chimel should have established
practical yet limited guidelines to provide for the occasional necessity of

152. Id. at 53.
153. Id.

154. Id. at 54,56-57.
155. Id, at 57. The Eighth Circuit concluded that requiring the officers to procure a
search warrant in Blake would have unreasonably risked immediate destruction or
removal of the evidence, because the officers did not have probable cause to arrest or
detain the defendant. Id. at 54. The court distinguished United States v. Davis, observing that the danger of destruction or removal of evidence in Davis was remote and no
accomplice was known to be present. Id. at 56; see 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir.), cer.
denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).

156. In sustaining a "fan out" security search of an arrestee's entire apartment during
which a sawed-off shotgun was seized, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Briddle
attempted to distinguish security searches from the search involved in Chimel.436 F.2d 4,
8 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921 (1971). The court reasoned that the Chimel
standard of the area within the arrestee's immediate control was not applicable because
there was no indication in Chimel that "any of the challenged items had been in the plain
view of any officer who... was in a place where he had a right to be as part of a concededly
proper security check. ." Id at 8. The court did not face the issue squarely, however,
since the Supreme Court in Chimel indicated that such security searches could not be conducted without a warrant. See 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
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a search to prevent destruction of evidence. S7 Justice White, dissenting
in Chimel, proposed an exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement that would permit searches to prevent destruction of evidence.
The proposal would allow a warrantless search of the home at which an
arrest occurs if two conditions are met: the existence of probable cause to
believe seizable items are on the premises and the presence of other
exigent circumstances, such as a clear danger that evidence would be
destroyed if the police left the scene to obtain a search warrant. 15 8 This
reasoning also could justify a warrantless search for evidence on the
person of any third party present. In failing to emphasize the warrant
requirement, Justice White's proposal would further weaken fourth
amendment safeguards. The history of the search incident to arrest
doctrine provides telling evidence of this withering process: if a warrant
is not demanded, the police will not obtain warrants even when they have
ample time, and searches will extend far beyond the limits a warrant
would have imposed. The police also might falsely claim the existence of
exigent circumstances or themselves create a situation that would permit
the exception to be applied.' 9
To assure fourth amendment liberties, searches involving present or
suspected third parties at an arrest should be governed by more definite
standards. Courts should allow a Terry pat-down search of third parties
present at the scene of an arrest when police have a reasonable suspicion
that the third party is armed and dangerous. Police also should be permitted to search the area near third parties only when the officer knows
of specific and articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion that such

157. Several commentators have proposed standards by which the validity of warrant-

less searches would be determined. See ALl

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-

§ SS 230.5 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972) (warrantless search approved if arrestee in
or on premises and in view of circumstances police have reason to believe evidence present
is likely to be removed before warrant could be obtained); Comment, ThirdPartyDestruction of Evidence and the Warrantless Search of Premises, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 111, 121
(search approved where probable cause to believe third party present, immediate action
necessary to prevent destruction of evidence, probable cause did not exist before police
arrived, and police did not create exigent circumstances).
158. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773-75 (White, J., with Black, J., dissenting).
159. See generally Note, Police Practicesand the Threatened Destruction of Tangible
Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1971). To prevent police abuse and assure an arrestee's
fourth amendment rights and yet prevent the destruction of evidence, the premises should
be impounded while the police obtain a search warrant. See id. at 1474, 1477-81 (suggested
guidelines for impoundment); cf. United States v. van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249,252 (1970)
(29 hour detention of package at post office while search warrant obtained not violative of
fourth amendment).
CEDURE
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persons may reach for a weapon and use it. 160 No other searches of third
parties should be allowed. The Chimel standard of "area within the
arrestee's immediate control" is arbitrary, and the requirement of probable cause should apply to all broad area evidence searches that are
undertaken because of the threat that third parties may destroy or conceal evidence. The balance between the government's interest in preserving evidence and the fourth amendment guarantee of privacy is identical
whether the destruction or concealment of evidence is threatened by the
arrestee or by third parties.
Chimel dictates that warrantless searches for evidence never be permitted outside the area within the arrestee's immediate control; this
mandate applies even where the arresting officer knows of specific facts
that establish probable cause to believe evidence on the premises or on
the person of a third party is likely to be destroyed or concealed if a
search is not conducted immediately. Such evidence searches should be
allowed, but only in exceptional circumstances where it is impractical to
obtain a warrant. If police anticipated before the arrest that evidence
would be present, however, the police should obtain a search warrant and
a warrantless search would not be allowed.' 61 Mere suspicion or fear that
evidence would be destroyed or concealed should not per se justify a
warrantless search for evidence; the interests protected by the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement are to be preferred over the risk of
destruction or loss of evidence. Although evidence will not necessarily be
destroyed or secreted when the police leave the scene to procure a search
warrant, once fourth amendment protections are breached by a warrantless search, an individual's privacy cannot be restored if the search later
is invalidated.
REINVIGORATING THE WARRANT PROCESS:
THE NEED FOR TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS

Post-Chimel experience clearly indicates that judicial restrictions on
police authority to search, especially those widely perceived as
arbitrary,162 cannot alone assure that the police will comply with the
intent of the fourth amendment by obtaining search warrants whenever
practical. New procedures must be devised that will simplify the warrant
160. Allowing a search of the area around third parties presenting a danger to police
fosters the governmental interest in protecting law enforcement personnel. An alternative
that intrudes less on fourth amendment rights would require the arresting officer to
request that third persons move away from the area where weapons may be secreted.
161. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971).
162. See generallyCarrington, supranote 59, at 591-94.
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process and encourage police officers to obtain search warrants. By
providing effective law enforcement techniques, the new process will
further the privacy expectations of citizens and thereby improve citizenpolice relations.
Studies on search warrants reveal that police will not obtain search
warrants, even when they have the time, unless required to do so by the
courts.

63

The Harris and Rabinowitz decisions actually encouraged

police not to obtain search warrants by approving intensive and wideranging searches incident to arrest. In Chimel the Court sought to limit
police reliance on the search incident to arrest exception by emphasizing
the need to obtain search warrants.164 Whether more warrants have been
obtained as a result of Chimel, however, is questionable.' 6 The search
incident to arrest exception continues to provide police with a convenient
alternative to the warrant process' 66 and encourages pretext arrests that
163. More than 90 percent of all searches coming to the attention of courts at all levels
in recent years involved searches incident to arrest. L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE &
D. ROTENBERG, supra note 5, at 122. Figures reflecting the dearth of warrants obtained by
police in the period after Harrisand Rabinowitz are astounding. During the years 1956
and 1957,29 search warrants were issued in Detroit, 30 in Milwaukee, and 17 in Wichita;
the statistics for these three cities had changed little by 1967. Id. at 100. A Minneapolis
city official could recall only two search warrants from 1929 to 1954, and the city had no
record of any warrants issued between 1954 and 1961. Kamisar, On the Tactics ofPoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 441 (1964). In 1966,
29,084 serious crimes were reported in San Francisco, but police obtained only 19 search
warrants. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLI E FUNCTION 256 (Tentative
Draft 1972).
164. See Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969).
165. Studies made on the effect of Mapp v. Ohio on police conduct indicate that
Supreme Court mandates in the search and seizure area can have an impact on police
behavior. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 5, at 100; see 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (states must exclude from criminal prosecutions evidence obtained in violation
of fourth amendment). Prior to Mapp, few search warrants had been issued in New York
City, but from 1961 to 1963 over 5000 warrants were issued in that city. L. TIFFANY, D.
MCINTYRE &D. ROTENBERG, supra at 100. The total number of narcotics misdemeanor
cases in New York City also fell dramatically in the year after the Mapp decision. Police
generally had 30 percent fewer narcotics cases in 1962, and narcotics specialists had 47
percent fewer cases in 1962 than in 1961. Chevigny, PoliceAbuses in Connection with the
Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIm. L. BULL. 3, 9 (1969). These figures suggest that a
significant number of policemen chose not to make arrests in violation of the Mapp standards. Id.
166. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE &D. ROTENBERG,supra note 5, at 105. The authors note:
A search incident to arrest is more often relied upon by the police than alternative
methods of searching, such as by a search warrant, primarily because administratively it is more convenient. There are no written forms to complete, no need to
present evidence to the magistrate or prosecutor on the question of probable
cause prior to the search, and hence there is minimal expenditure of time in the
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allow police to search for evidence of other crimes.'6 7
One explanation for the figures showing minimal reliance on search
warrants is that as a practical matter police do not have time to obtain
them. An arrest coming after "hot pursuit" supports this reasoning;
when police arrest a suspect just after commission of the crime, the
circumstances often will establish probable cause to believe that evidence
of the crime is still on the person.'68 The popular image of the police
officer catching the criminal in hot pursuit, however, should be qualified.
Statistical studies indicate that almost 50 percent of all arrests are made
within two hours of the crime;' 6' about 45 percent of all arrests occur
more than one day after the crime, and nearly 35 percent are made after
one week has passed.' 70 Proponents of warrantless arrests argue that by
the time probable cause to arrest exists, the police must move quickly
since the defendant will already be alerted.' 7 1 But in at least 45 percent of
the arrests made the police do have time to obtain an arrest warrant; if
the defendant has not left the jurisdiction by the first day after the crime,
he probably will not leave.'7
The facts of Chimel illustrate that police often have time to obtain a
search warrant but instead rely on the search incident to arrest excepinvestigation of a case. The search incident to arrest also has the advantage of
making an immediate search possible without the delay required to obtain a
warrant.
ItL at 122.
167. Id-at 131-32. Tiffany, McIntyre, and Rotenberg emphasize the willingness and
ability of the police to use the search incident to arrest doctrine as a pretext to search for
evidence of other crimes by quoting police officers:
[Ylou can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him for a
while, and then a search can be made.
You don't have to follow a driver very long before he will move to the other side
of the yellow line and then you can arrest and search him....
Id at 131.
168. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (no warrant required where
police arrived at house within minutes of report that robbery suspect entered). Justice
White has suggested that the fact of an arrest per so creates the exigent circumstances
justifying the search for weapons and evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773
(1969) (White, J., with Black, J., dissenting).
169. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96 (1967).
170. Id. In terms of cumulative figures, the arrestrate is as follows: after 30 minutes, 36
percent arrested; after two hours, 48 percent arrested; after eight hours, 51 percent
arrested; after one day, 55 percent arrrested; after one week, 65 percent arrested; and
after one month, 95 percent arrested. Id.
171. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776-81 (1969) (White, J., with Black, J., dissenting).
172. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, supranote 169, at 96.
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tion. In Chimel the police knew the identity of the defendant and where
he lived; moreover, they had obtained an arrest warrant for a crime that
had been committed one month earlier. The question should be asked:
Why was no search warrant obtained when it was quite practicable to get
one? The Supreme Court ignored this question by assuming that
searches incident to an arrest always are justified if conducted within a
proper scope and duration. Because over a month had passed since the
commission of the crime for which the defendant in Chimel was arrested,
however, it was unlikely the suspect would have had evidence of that
crime on his person. No genuine exigent circumstances can justify a
warrantless search in such a case; if probable cause exists to believe that
the suspect will be carrying evidence of the crime, the police have time to
obtain a warrant. A blanket rule allowing a search of the person of the
arrestee incident to an arrest lacks a rational basis.
Police will accept a new warrant process and use it effectively only if
the procedures are practical for law enforcement. A basic rule, therefore,
should provide that law enforcement authorities obtain search warrants
whenever practicable. The "whenever practicable" standard should
apply to searches incident to arrest, since the search incident exception
has spawned the greatest abuse of the fourth amendment. Police should
receive appropriate training, of course, and departmental policy and
regulatory supervision should exist to enforce the rule.
To encourage and make more practical this rule, the police should be
allowed to obtain warrants over the telephone. A telephonic search
warrant process clearly would provide a practical alternative to existing
procedures. 73 During a recorded telephone conversation, the officer
makes a sworn statement requesting the issuance of a search warrant
and presenting the facts giving probable cause to search. This statement
would be tantamount to an affidavit and would be transcribed for later
reference. The magistrate's oral authorization to conduct the search
would permit the requesting officer to sign the judge's name on a
duplicate warrant form, which is deemed a proper search warrant. The
judge signs and files the original warrant with the court clerk. Following
execution of the warrant, the officer files with the court the duplicate and
the original warrant, the inventory of the search, and the transcription of
74
the recorded conversation.
173. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, POLICE 95 (1973). "[E]very State [should] enact legislation that provides for the
issuance of search warrants pursuant to telephoned petitions and affidavits from police
officers." Id
174. A few states have provided for telephonic search warrants. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
13-1444 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1975).
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Adoption of a telephonic search warrant system by police throughout
the country would enhance both the reality and the appearance of justice.
The police could obtain warrants easily and rapidly on a showing of probable cause, citizens would know that judicial approval by a neutral
magistrate preceded police invasion of their privacy, and the courts
would have a workable means to deter unlawful or undesirable police
conduct. The availability of the recording and transcription of the conversation between the policeman and the magistrate serves two
purposes. The accused could determine that the process had protected his
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and the police would
review
have the assurance that the search will be upheld on subsequent
75
as long as the conversation reveals probable cause to search.1
Simplification of the warrant system will benefit the police in several
ways. By obtaining a search warrant before conducting an investigation,
the police often will find that individuals affected by the warrant are
more willing to cooperate.1 76 The warrant indicates to these persons that
the search does not result from a spur-of-the-moment decision but from a
deliberate conclusion reached by the police and by a judicial officer. The
existence of a search warrant also can minimize the chance of objections
to the search by other concerned individuals or members of the general
public. The warrant will minimize the possibility of an altercation by
allowing the policeman to explain that he is only doing his duty in
carrying out the warrant's command.1 77 Even when it appears that the
officer himself demanded the warrant, the suspect will see that others
concurred in his decision.' 78 These advantages of obtaining a warrant will
reinforce continued adherence to the warrant process. The most
important benefit resulting from improving the warrant process is the increased citizen respect, cooperation, and support for law enforcement
efforts. In 1966 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice concluded that police estrangement from the

175. The procedure assumes that magistrates are sufficiently independent of the police
and have adequate training to make an informed determination of whether probable cause
exists. Reinvigorating the warrant process might stimulate the states to upgrade the
magistrate function as the federal government already has done. See Federal Magistrates
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1970) (jurisdiction and powers of federal magistrates). Even if magistrates "rubber stamp" telephonic requests for warrants, the establishment of an early
record presenting the facts creating probable cause will be useful in later suppression
hearings.
176. W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 44-45

(1965).
177. Id at 45.
178. Id
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community and the courts is the biggest problem confronting law enforcement, and that this estrangement is an urgent problem in cities.179
The failure of courts to establish standards that allow police to enforce
the law effectively, consistent with constitutional mandates, has contributed to the perceptions of many individuals and community groups that
police actions are often unauthorized, unjustified, and illegal. Any
measure that will encourage police to seek search warrants necessarily
will improve police relations with communities and ease the existing feeling of estrangement.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of search incident to arrest should be reconsidered by the
Supreme Court because it is arbitrary and lacks a sound rationale. The
Chimel rule permitting a full scale search of the arrestee regardless of the
purpose and circumstances of arrest is overbroad; recent cases demonstrate that the standard enunciated by the Court in Chimel generally has
failed to achieve its primary purpose of limiting the Harris-Rabinowitz
rule regulating the scope of the search and therefore infringes unreasonably on fourth amendment rights.
In Chimel the Court assumed that the objectives of the weapons search
and of the evidence search inextricably are related and concluded that
where the circumstances warrant a weapons search, a search for evidence
also is reasonable. In formulating a new standard the Court should
distinguish between weapons and evidence searches. The scope of the
warrantless search incident to arrest properly should be a function of the
different objectives of each type of search: weapon searches serve to prevent violence and escape while searches for evidence are conducted solely
to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence. The Supreme
Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio implicitly recognizes this distinction
between weapons and evidence searches in concluding that the protection
of police officers and others from violence merits greater concern than the
prevention of the concealment or destruction of evidence.
To assure the protection of police officers and still comply with the
fourth amendment's mandate that all searches be reasonable, the following standard is proposed: first, all weapons searches incident to arrest
should be governed by the standard of Terry v. Ohio and should be
preceded by a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee or a third party
potentially is armed and dangerous; second, a search for evidence inci179. 1PrEsmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTATION
THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY ii

(1966).
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dent to arrest should be governed by the standard of probable cause and
a warrant should be obtained whenever practical.
The suggested standard effectively deals with the difficulties posed by
the presence of third parties at the scene of the arrest. Under Chimel,
police officers are not allowed to conduct warrantless searches outside
the area within the arrestee's immediate control, even when probable
cause exists to believe third parties are present and may conceal or
destroy evidence. The suggested standard allows such searches in those
exigent circumstances where it would be impractical to obtain a search
warrant. By allowing evidence searches where there is probable cause
and where it would be impractical to obtain a warrant, the standard also
replaces the dual standard evidenced by the law of automobiles, where
the police may search without a warrant upon a showing of probable
cause, and the law governing residence searches, where the police cannot conduct a warrantless search. Evidence located in an automobile
does not have higher susceptibility to being disposed than does evidence
found in the home. In both situations, the nature of the evidence and the
likelihood of its destruction or concealment in the particular circumstances should be evaluated according to the suggested standard.
The warrantless search incident to arrest exception to the fourth
amendment has emasculated the Constitution's warrant requirement;
today, the search warrant process is used rarely. Modem technology and
procedures, such as telephonic search warrants, should be utilized in conjunction with the proposed standard in an effort to make it more practical for police officers to obtain search warrants. Such procedures recognize the time constraints under which police officers often operate and
still assure compliance with the fourth amendment. By imposing a new
standard on searches incident to arrest that requires police officers to
obtain search warrants, the courts would reduce the need and opportunity for pretext arrests. Moreover, by revitalizing the warrant requirement, courts undoubtedly would increase citizen respect,
cooperation, and support for law enforcement, the factors upon which the
success of law enforcement ultimately depends.

